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Passing resemblance: the burden of the mask in legal and theatrical tradition
Abstract
Legal scholars have frequently observed that the word ‘person’ and the language of legal ‘personality’
derives from the Latin persona, which was the ancient Romans’ term for an actor’s mask, but they have
seldom attended to the theatrical significance of the mask and sought there for insights into the legal
idea. To address that lack, this article presents three case studies connected by concern for the passing
on of theatrical masks. The first mask was made for a ballet directed by the Hungarian dancer and
choreographer Rudolf Laban in Germany in the 1930s. The mask escaped when Hitler burned Laban’s
books and was passed from hand to hand until it eventually found its way to England. The second mask
is the mask of Pulcinella, one of the principal stock characters or ‘Masks’ of the commedia dell’arte. The
focus in relation to this mask is upon its passing to the renowned Italian actor Eduardo De Filippo and
from him to his actor son, Luca. The third is the hannya mask of traditional Japanese Noh theatre, which
is a demonic mask associated with scorned and jealous women. It features in the cult Japanese horror
film Onibaba (Shindo 1964) where it carries a cautionary tale on death, the passing of masks, and the
fixing of masks; a cautionary tale that this article carries over to the performance of masks in law. The
three case studies suggest that the burden of the mask is most keenly felt when it is laden with the
weight of tradition. Whilst taking a broadly positive view of the art and artifice of theatrical masking, it is
acknowledged that the benefits of masking depend upon artificial representation through a non-human
property and therefore cannot exist without corresponding burdens, including the burdens inherent in
property relations, representation, and mediation.
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Passing resemblance: the burden of the
mask in legal and theatrical tradition
Gary Watt1
1 Introduction
This article presents three case studies that are connected by their
concern for the passing on of theatrical masks. The reference to
‘tradition’ in the title is an allusion to the Roman Law practice of
traditio by which assets were passed hand-to-hand. Despite their very
different theatrical contexts, we will see that the three case studies all
suggest that the burden of the mask is most keenly felt when it is laden
with the weight of tradition. What I mean by this is that each of the
three theatrical masks needs to be passed on at some point in their
story, and the moment the mask should be removed to new hands
– the moment of its re-presentation – is the moment when, across
all three cases, the burden of the mask becomes heaviest. I attribute
this in part to a dynamic by which representations seem to breed new
representations in something like the way that laws breed more laws
and lies breed more lies. Once the maker has made something, we
now have the artificer and the artefact – one has become two – and
because the artefact has its own identity it will, in turn, make new
things happen. There is therefore a sort of thickening or encumbering
of representations. Perhaps this is the start of a theory, or perhaps it is
just an observation, but if a similar dynamic operates in law, as I will
seek to show it does, we will have the beginnings of a novel point of
22
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comparison between theatre and law, and one which would suggest
that the law’s use of the metaphor of the persona – the actor’s mask – is
not merely ornamental, but is indicative of something deeply felt in
legal and theatrical arts of representation.
2 The artifice of the mask
Before we turn to the three case studies of theatrical mask, it should be
acknowledged that there is at least one theatrical tradition that utterly
rejects the artificial mask. Jerzy Grotowski’s ‘Poor Theatre’, which
Marett Leiboff advocates for its ‘new morality, ethics and responsibility
of theatre’ (2020: 91) – and upon which Leiboff relies as the basis for
her ‘theatrical jurisprudence’ – seeks to strip away superficial theatrical
artifice in the belief that moral truth might be found beneath. One
feature of this is the rejection of conceptual character masks in favour
of expressing the actor’s mind directly through their face (Leiboff
2020: 92-3). In Towards a Poor Theatre, Grotowski writes:
The composition of a fixed facial expression by using the actor’s muscles
and inner impulses achieves the effect of a striking transubstantiation,
while the mask prepared by a makeup artist is only a trick. …
Theatre – through the actor’s technique, his art in which the living
organism strives for higher motives – provides an opportunity for what
could be called integration, the discarding of masks, the revealing
of the real substance: a totality of physical and mental reactions
(Grotowski 2002 (1968): 21, 255-6).

Grotowski’s serious point is also deliberately provocative. He
acknowledges that the ‘effort to peel off the life-mask, the theatre …
has always seemed to me a place of provocation … This defiance of
taboo, this transgression, provides the shock which rips off the mask’
(Grotowski 2002 (1968): 21-22). Grotowski accepts that there is ‘no
contradiction between inner technique and artifice (articulation of a role
by signs)’ (2002 (1968): 17), but he prefers the face naturally expressed
to the face performed, displayed, or otherwise made up.
I take a more positive view of the art and artifice of theatrical
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masking, but it must be admitted that the benefits of masking depend
upon artificial representation through a non-human property and
therefore cannot exist without corresponding burdens, including the
burdens inherent in property relations, representation, and mediation.
The three theatrical case studies, when we come to them, will
demonstrate the potentially high human cost of those burdens. Also
burdensome is the performance of legal masking, including putting on
the mask that a lawyer assumes in order to represent a client, and living
with the mask of legal persona in the form of corporate personality.
That said, I will now attempt a defence of artificial masking in
theatre. We must begin with the admission that a mask made up
with cosmetics or leather or wood is clearly artificial and is literally
superficial. It might even be called an ‘illusion’, if we reconnect that
word to its etymological root in the Latin verb ludere, meaning ‘to play.’
However, to dismiss a theatrical mask as ‘only a trick’, as Grotowski
does, is unduly negative. V for Vendetta, the graphic novel (Moore and
Lloyd 1982-1989) and movie (Wachowski and Wachowski 2005),
which we consider again below, contains the line ‘artists use lies to
tell the truth.’ It is an old idea. In his 1576 essay Apology for Raymond
Sebond, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), comparing legal fiction to
female facial cosmetics, acknowledged the possibility that the law’s idea
of truth might be based on the legitimate falsehood of poetic fiction:
Just as women use ivory teeth where their own are lacking, and,
instead of their true complexion, create one from some foreign matter;
… and in plain sight of everyone embellish themselves with a false
and borrowed beauty: so does science (and even our law, they say,
has legitimate ﬁctions on which it founds the truth of its justice) (de
Montaigne 2003: 98).

This hints at the hopeful possibility that a trick might become
a trick of the light. What is more, to dismiss the art of an artificial
mask as ‘only a trick’ as Grotowski does, whilst usefully indicating
the persuasive power of a crafted superfice, also runs the risk of
underestimating that power.
In this article, I approach the problem from the other side. My
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project is to expose the crafts of power not by discarding the superfice
but by attending to its makeup and its modes of operation. I want to
show how the mask is made, how it is performed, and how it makes
the bearer feel. Leiboff strips away the artifice in search of justice. I
examine the artifice in search of law. The two projects are compatible
with each other. Law, like theatre, is patently performed, human-made,
and artificial. Its reality is representative reality. To appreciate the arts of
the law we must attend to surface, superfice, and signs. The insights that
theatre provides in this project of appreciation begin with recognition
that the arts of the cosmetic artist and the maker of masks are every
bit as expressive as the physical face of the actor who presents them. In
his book, The Life of the Drama, Eric Bentley writes that ‘[t]he theatrical
situation, reduced to a minimum, is that A impersonates B while C
looks on’ (1964: 150). We might equally say that ‘the legal situation,
reduced to a minimum, is that A represents B while C looks on.’ The
latter is an accurate summary of legal representation tout court, and not
just courtroom representation before a judicial audience. Even a solicitor
negotiating the terms of a commercial lease is representing their client
under the scrutiny – imagined and sometimes physically present – of
‘the other side.’ In any process of legal drafting or negotiation, as in the
preparation and performance of any courtroom trial, the other side casts
its shadow. The lawyer who erects the edifice of their own case without
anticipating loopholes that the other side might exploit does only half
a job. Legal representation therefore entails action and performance
grounded in an imagined confrontation between the ‘abutting fronts’
of client and opponent. Shakespeare used the phrase ‘abutting fronts’
to describe the clashing vanguards of two armies in the theatre of
war, but the phrase serves well as a description of the clash in theatres
of law between opposing fronts that legal representatives perform on
behalf of their clients. Shakespeare’s phrase appears in the Prologue to
the opening act of Henry V and is part of what I would suggest is the
most sustained express appeal in any of his plays to the engagement
of audience imagination in the process of theatrical production. ‘Into
a thousand parts divide one man’ (Henry V 1.prologue.24) urges the
Chorus, before informing the playgoers ‘‘tis your thoughts that now
25
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must deck our kings’ (Henry V 1.prologue.28). A theatrical battle
royal isn’t a battle real. A solitary actor on the stage represents a
thousand soldiers in the field. This, again, is akin to the nature of legal
representation. A lawyer acting in litigation may front a whole mass
of clients in a so-called ‘collective’, ‘class’, or ‘representative’ action; or
a lawyer may be a front for a corporation which is sometimes itself a
front for a legion of human individuals. The lawyer when putting on
a front and standing front stage in court is therefore an impersonator
in the theatrical sense, as Eric Bentley described it, and also an
exemplar of a social masker performing in theatrical mode, as Erving
Goffman described it in his book The Presentation of Self in Everyday
Life. Goffman attached the label ‘front’ to ‘that part of the individual’s
performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion
to define the situation for those who observe the performance’ (1959:
32). Interestingly, the Swedish version of Goffman’s book goes under
the title Jaget och Maskerna, which translates ‘The Self and the Masks.’
There is always a risk in representative actions that when interested
parties are concealed behind the mask of impersonation, their interests
may be overborne, overlooked, or even obliterated. The mask of
representation is at risk of becoming a mask of misrepresentation; and
most worrisome of all is the possibility that the performance of power
will become uncoupled from responsibility and accountability. This is
part of the concern identified by Grotowski and Leiboff. The risks of
misrepresentation and lack of responsibility are incidents of the fact that
masks confer anonymity and serve to misdirect and deflect the gaze of
critical supervisors. Hence the dominance of the mask in comic book
treatments of vigilantes who pursue their own brand of justice outside
of, or alongside, the law – think Batman, The Watchmen’s Rorschach
character (Giddens 2018: 143), and V for Vendetta. ‘Vengeance is mine,
I will repay, says the Lord’ (Romans 12:19), but comic book vigilantes
usurp the divine prerogative and therefore might need to put on masks
to hide themselves from divine scrutiny. In saying this, I have in mind
the suggestion that the ancient original of the theatrical mask might
have been designed to deflect the critical gaze of the divine supervisor:
‘the actor of the Greek theatre put on the “mask” that turned the actor
26
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into a “persona” … to signify that there was no intention to challenge
the gods by this conduct but only to play a “role”’ (Savona 2005: 105,
quoted in Mohr 2008: 31). The danger that legal representation might
engender misrepresentation and a lack of responsibility is clear in the
case of the incorporated company. Originally conceived with the role
of representing human interests, it has now become alive in the front or
mask of legal personality and thriving thus has to a great extent effaced
the life of the human beings that backed it into being. The corporation
has become one with the artificial mask of its legal personality, and
exemplifies what Edward Mussawir and Connal Parsley describe as a
person operating ‘where there is no corresponding real individual’ and
according to ‘an inventive technical precision’ (2017: 52). The corporate
person is pure craft, a triumph of human technê over the human
corporeal. Although my method differs somewhat from Leiboff’s, we
share the aim of freeing the human body from the law (Leiboff 2020:
8-9) and ensuring that humanity animates the thing that goes by the
label ‘body of law.’
Legal scholars have frequently observed that the word ‘person’ and
the language of legal ‘personality’ derives from the Latin persona, which
was the ancient Romans’ term for an actor’s mask, but they have seldom
attended to the theatrical significance of the mask and sought there for
insights into the legal idea. John T. Noonan, Jr. is an exception. In his
book Persons and Masks of the Law, he explores the theatrical analogy
of the legal mask. Like me, Noonan emphasises the craft aspect of
legal mask-making, but like Grotowski he regards this in a wholly
negative light as being inherently an oppression of the human rather
than having the positive potential of being an expression of human art.
Noonan clarifies that by ‘mask’, he means ‘a legal construct suppressing
the humanity of a participant in the process’ (1976: 20). He purports
to distinguish this negative idea of the artificial mask from Goffman’s
idea that our everyday social ‘front’ operates like a theatrical mask
(Noonan 1976: 20). Would it not be possible, I wonder, to attempt to
maintain a positive connection between the human theatrical art of
social self-expression and the legal arts of human representation? If it
is not, the concern is that the legal mask will become untethered from
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the human arts that construct it and will then be at liberty to construct
itself. The weakness in Noonan’s assumption that the human art of selfexpression is necessarily alien to the human art of legal expression is
clear from his etymologically confused attempt to argue that the ‘mask’
– a bad thing – is different to a ‘person’ – a good thing. ‘Masks conceal
persons’, is his complaint (Noonan 1976: 26), and yet Goffman’s point
was precisely that masks are persons and persons are masks. However
muddled Noonan’s etymology might be, Walter Weyrauch explains that
Noonan’s motives are sound, for he hopes ‘to overcome the tendency
of the legal process to ignore its individual participants’ (1978: 699).
This is also the ambition shared by Grotowski and Leiboff. Quibbles
over methodology and etymology aside, I also share it.

Thomas Hobbes was one of the earliest thinkers to pay something
more than lip service to the connection between the legal persona
and the theatrical mask. He noted their connected functions of
representation and impersonation:
The word person ... signifies the face, as persona in Latin signifies the
disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the stage;
and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the
face, as mask or vizard: and from the stage, hath been translated to
any representer of speech and action, as well in tribunals, as theatres.
So that a person, is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in
common conversation; and to personate, is to act, or represent himself,
or another; and he that acteth another, is said to bear his person, or
act in his name (Hobbes 1963 (1651): 168-9).

Peter Goodrich is an exception to the general neglect of the
theatrical mask in legal scholarship. The mask is a wayfarer through
his writing, showing up here and there, from the ‘nomadic masks’ that
are signalled in the subtitle to his book Languages of Law (1990) to the
plastic Guy Fawkes mask that featured in the film V for Vendetta and
appears in Professor Goodrich’s chapter ‘Retinal Justice: Rats, Maps,
and Masks’ (2021). Goodrich rightly believes that if a thing is worth
saying it is worth performing, and I have personally seen him don a
Guy Fawkes mask and stand on a chair to deliver a provocation at an
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otherwise earnest gathering of legal scholars, proving that playing the
fool near the throne of law is a most necessary and serious business.
The Guy Fawkes mask has become the face of the ‘Anonymous’ anticapitalist/hacker/anarchist movement, and in November 2014 it also
featured in the early days of the Black Lives Matter protest movement.
Goodrich discusses the arrest of a man for violating the mask provision
in the State of Georgia’s legal code when he wore a Guy Fawkes mask
at a protest in Atlanta (Gates v Khokhar). The protest had been provoked
by the decision of a grand jury in Ferguson, Missouri, not to indict
the white police officer Darren Wilson who had shot dead the black
citizen Mike Brown. The relevant section of Georgia’s legal code makes
it a misdemeanour for a person to wear ‘a mask, hood, or device by
which any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to
conceal the identity of the wearer’ in public or on private land without
permission. Exceptions include ‘using a mask in a theatrical production
including use in Mardi Gras celebrations and masquerade balls.’ There
is no exception for political protest (Ga Code Ann § 16-11-38).
Highly pertinent for present purposes is the following passage
taken from Goodrich’s book Law in the Courts of Love, in which he
imagines the mask of legal persona to be a thing that defies death
when it passes on:
In immediate logical terms, law masks death in the sense that the
institution of tradition is concerned precisely with the passing on of
structures across and against the blandishments of time. To the extent
that law constitutes and transmits traditions as meanings, as persons,
things and actions, it establishes the very form of survival as repetition
and in a stronger sense as eternal recurrence. In passing on – and it
is not accidental that passing on is also a metaphor for death – the
deep structures or forms of social reproduction, the legal tradition is
bound classically to expressing or imagining death as the incident of
inheritance, as the structure of sociality. Death is what passes, what
succeeds, unacknowledged, from father to son (Goodrich 1996: 167).

I recently wrote something in (seriously) playful mode, which on
reflection, but not consciously by inspiration, combines Goodrich’s idea
of passing on the mask with Hobbes’s idea of representation. Repeating
29
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my own thought here is a sort of representation of myself through
re-presentation, which illustrates the paradoxical phenomenon with
which the quote, as I now interpret it, is concerned. The phenomenon
is the one that occurs whenever we try to peel away a mask as a gesture
to detachment, estrangement, or authenticity; for in the moment of
making that gesture – which is by definition an action or an act – we are
performing a denial of performance and thereby thickening our mask
even as we purport to remove it. The following lines can be interpreted
as an allusion to this phenomenon of thickening at work in the law’s
representations whenever a person passes on. If this interpretation is
accurate, it suggests the haunting possibility that the legal mechanisms
by which we represent the death of a human being might have the
effect of fixing on the legal mask more firmly and more thickly in the
very gesture by which we purport to peel it away. This is what I wrote:
Personality is a metaphor, an actor’s mask, a superfice impenetrable
and unprobable as any proof, the persona represents the human, and
passes on death to the personal representative, who becomes thereby
a representation of a representation, the lawyer who represents the
personal representative is a representation upon a representation upon
a representation, if we kill the lawyers we might only make things
worse (Watt 2021).

Not that the law will let us kill the lawyers. The law as entity needs
the lawyer as entity to embody its performance. The whole project
of law in society can be regarded as one of making a face and saving
face, as I have argued in a chapter titled ‘The Face the Law Makes’
(2013: ch 4). Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, the former Master
of the Rolls, once gave a lecture in which he cautioned his judicial
colleagues that they should not let the ‘judicial mask slip’ in public
because of the risk of ‘devaluing the coinage’ of judicial respectability
(2012: par [53]). The former Lord Justice of Appeal, Alan Moses
(2008), has written in similar vein of his concern that when judges
are distracted into administrative roles such as the chairing of public
inquiries, the judiciary is in danger of losing the mystique of the
mask through which it maintains its authority. The biblical Moses
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was also a respecter of law, authority, and masks. Bettetini reminds
us that ‘the Greek bible used the term prosopon for the face of God
which Moses dared not look at’ (Bettetini 2004: 109–110, quoted in
Mohr 2008: 37). Inviting comparisons with his biblical namesake’s
sanctified isolation on Sinai, Alan Moses opines that ‘the mystique
of the judge, the separation of judge from public is of significance in
supporting the acceptability and authority of the decision’ (2008: 22).
The key word here is ‘separation.’ The Attic Greek term for theatrical
acting, Hypokrisis, is related to krinein, which denotes the action of
separating, deciding, judging. The art of judgment is performed in the
process of separation – which is ‘discrimination’ in its positive sense.
The problem comes when the artificial mask is presented as the true
and only face, effacing the human and the art that animates it. This is
where the falsehood of under-separation (‘hypo-crisy’) comes in, with
all the ills that attend it. For Moses, the theatrical separation of the
judiciary from humanity is what is required, even if that risks personal
hypocrisy by effacing the human judge behind the mask of their
official role. Borrowing from Oscar Wilde (2000 (1891): 191), Moses
says that ‘[t]he judge is least himself when he talks in his own person.
Give him a mask and he will tell you the truth.’ Moses is seemingly
content, as was the mask-wearing protagonist of Max Beerbohm’s 1897
play The Happy Hypocrite, to ‘wear it until I die’ (Moses 2008: 23-24).
Of course, the irony in Moses’s pretension to fix on the legal mask so
firmly, is that his very gesture of fixing it occurs in the act of extrajudicial writing – a context in which the judicial mask is supposedly
removed. Commenting on Alan Moses’s article, Marett Leiboff notes
(2018: 360) that according to The Guardian, Moses ‘is the court of
appeal judge who showed too much personality to advance to the very
summit of the judiciary’ (Bowcott and Greenslade 2014). In light of
that biographical note, we can perhaps read Moses’s excursus on ‘The
Mask and the Judge’ as a sort of confessional concerning the conflict
between human personality and the legal persona.
Without taking our eyes off the law, it is now time to introduce
the three theatrical dramatis personae of our piece. The first mask of
our three was made for a ballet directed by the Hungarian dancer and
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choreographer Rudolf Laban in Germany in the 1930s. The mask
escaped when Hitler burned Laban’s books and was passed from hand
to hand until it eventually found its way to England where it has, so far
as I can discover, lost itself. The second of our dramatis personae is the
mask of Pulcinella, one of the principal stock characters or ‘Masks’ of
the commedia dell’arte. Our focus in relation to the mask of this Mask
is upon its passing to the renowned Italian actor Eduardo De Filippo
and from him to his actor son, Luca. The third is the hannya mask of
traditional Japanese Noh theatre, which is a demonic mask associated
with scorned and jealous women. It features in the cult Japanese horror
film Onibaba (Shindo 1964) where it carries a cautionary tale on death,
the passing of masks, and the fixing of masks; a cautionary tale that I
will carry over to the performance of masks in law.
A The Laban Mask
The Hungarian dancer, choreographer, and dance theorist Rudolf
Laban trained a thousand dancers to perform in the Berlin Olympics
in 1936. The production Vom Tauwind und der Neuen Freude (‘Spring
Wind and the New Joy’) was to feature Mary Wigman and Harald
Kreutzburg, who, with Laban, were amongst Germany’s preeminent
dancers of the period. The production never took place. When
Reich Minister of Propaganda Dr. Josef Goebbels saw the dress
rehearsal, he promptly banned it on the ground of its modernism
and intellectualism. Elizabeth A. Hanley writes that ‘Goebbels was
outraged that Laban was attempting to use the Nazis for his own
goals’ (Hanley 2004: 135); goals which were, in very broad terms
and by various progressive techniques, directed at the liberation of
dance from the rigours of classical tradition. Hanley adds that the
choreography of Mary Wigman and Harald Kreutzburg went on to
feature in the Olympic festival, but ‘Laban was out of the Olympic
picture for good’ (Hanley 2004: 135). Laban was at this time head
of the German Master Studio for Dance (Deutsche Meisterwerkstätten
für Tanz), and when his contract expired on 31 March 1937, the Nazi
regime placed him under house arrest at a castle in Bayreuth. Later
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that year he escaped to Paris and onwards to England in 1938 (Hanley
2004: 138). By this time, the archives and material memory of his
work had largely been destroyed by the Nazi Propaganda Ministry.
Amongst the surviving artefacts were three beechwood masks that
Laban had given to Lola Eytel. The English educationalist Dorothy
Heathcote reports that Lola Eytel had carved thirty masks, including
these three, in the early thirties for Laban’s production ‘Motherhood
Against War’ featuring Mary Wigman and Harald Kreutzburg in the
main roles (O’Neill 2014: 152). Heathcote came to know Lola Eytel
and her sister Margaret, having met the sisters ‘to read English poetry
to them and remind them of their spoken English’ (O’Neill 2014: 152).
A friendship developed, one expression of which was a wedding gift
to Dorothy Heathcote of the only surviving mask of the three, the
other two having been lost in air raids (O’Neill 2014: 152), ‘believed
stolen’ (Heathcote 2004: 5/8). Whether any of the other thirty masks
have survived the Nazi destruction of Laban’s belongings must be very
doubtful.
The question that will exercise us here is what became of the mask
that was in Heathcote’s possession, and what we might learn from its
passing. In an epilogue to a volume of her essential writings, Heathcote
states that the mask ‘will finally rest with the Laban Institute, its
logical place’ (O’Neill 2014: 152). The ‘Laban Institute’ referred to
here may be the Institute based in New York that became the Laban/
Bartenieff Institute of Movement Studies (Labaninstitute.org), or it
may be referring to the Laban Dance Centre (founded in Manchester
as the Art of Movement Studio) which has been subsumed within
the Trinity Laban Conservatoire of Music and Dance. As I write,
the search for the mask amongst the archives of these candidates is
ongoing – to some extent delayed by the demands of compliance with
Covid-19 regulations. The age of the mask has masked the mask. The
plot thickens. I have, however, been able to discover further details
about the nature of the mask and its possible whereabouts from a small
archive containing Heathcote’s correspondence with the choreographer
Geraldine Stephenson. The archive also contains an unpublished
manuscript essay on the mask, written by Heathcote in February 2004.
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It is written in the first person from the perspective of the mask and is
titled simply ‘The Laban Mask’ (Heathcote 2004). The small collection
of papers containing the essay and the correspondence is held in the
Geraldine Stephenson Archive at The University of Surrey, and I am
grateful to University of Surrey archivist Harriet Costelloe for her
generous assistance in bringing the manuscripts to my attention. The
Eytel sisters died in the 1970s, Heathcote died in 2010, and Stephenson
died in 2018, so the main players in the mystery of the mask have
themselves passed on. I will discuss the contents of the University of
Surrey archive in two parts: first, Heathcote’s account of the nature of
the mask; second, clues as to its present whereabouts.

First, the physical makeup of the mask. In her manuscript essay of
2004, Heathcote describes it as a ‘beautiful grieving face’ (Heathcote
2004: 7/8), which is confirmed by a more detailed description in
Heathcote’s manuscript correspondence with Geraldine Stephenson
written in the year before Heathcote died. Heathcote explains in a
two-page letter dated 2 March 2010 that the mask is ‘hand carved,
plain oiled wood. It is a 3dimensional woman’s face, rather sad, and
life size as to features’ and that the ‘eyes are very simple holes, quite
round, so when it is fixed by the strings on the face, the actor/dancer
can see clearly through it’ (Heathcote 2010b: 1-2/2). She describes it
as very light and thin. Heathcote has inserted into the text two rough
sketches of the mask – one a front-on view of the mask hardly more
detailed than a sad face emoticon, but slightly more ovoid than circular,
the other a side profile sketch of the mask showing a small, sharply
angular nose and a rather large chin. It looks not unlike one of the Moai
statues of Rapa Nui (‘Easter Island’). The profile sketch also shows two
fixing holes on the side for securing the mask to the dancer’s face with
a string. Heathcote recalls that the holes are slightly damaged. She
adds in her manuscript essay ‘The Laban Mask’ that a photograph of
Mary Wigman and Harald Kreutzburg, together with the chorus line
wearing the masks, is held with her papers at Manchester Metropolitan
University (Heathcote 2004: 7-8/8). The Heathcote archive is now with
the Faculty of Education at Manchester Metropolitan University and
at the time of writing I am still seeking the photograph referred to.
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Second, clues to the mask’s present whereabouts. Heathcote writes
in her 2004 manuscript essay of her wish that it should be kept where
the public will be able to see it. (Heathcote 2004: 7/8). In a one-page
letter to Geraldine Stephenson dated 6 February 2010, there is an
overriding sense that Heathcote is anxious to get her affairs in order
(she died the following year), and that the passing of the mask to an
appropriate institution is high on her list of priorities. She opens with,
‘My Dear Geraldine – I’m writing out of anxiety about the Laban
mask in your care!’ and writes towards the end, ‘If you don’t want
it to go anywhere special, I’ll have it back and see that it does go to
Manchester!’ before signing off warmly ‘Much love - & memories of
Northern Theatre school and dear Laban’ (Heathcote 2010a). At the
top of the letter, a marginal note has been added at some later date in
what might be a weaker version of Heathcote’s hand, or the hand of
another writer. It reads, ‘G does not have it Laban Mask – not me – .’
The initial ‘G’ is presumably a reference to Geraldine Stephenson. That
handwritten note seems to be linked to the phrase ‘Laban mask in your
care’ which has been roughly and emphatically underlined, seemingly
by the unidentified second hand.
The only other letter to Geraldine Stephenson in the archive
is the letter of 2 March 2010 mentioned earlier. It is written in a
more terse and business-like tone. This letter signs off with ‘Many
thanks – please telephone me. Dorothy (Heathcote) Bradford Theatre
School!’ It begins with a brief recital or statement of the facts as the
correspondent recalls them, and a summary of the issues. As such, it
reads almost like a rehearsal for a legal statement of claim, especially
the reference to ‘my Laban mask which I gave into your care to pass
on to some Laban association in due course’ (Heathcote 2010b). The
essence, as Heathcote recounts it to Stephenson, is that Heathcote
and Stephenson had spoken by telephone the previous week and that
Heathcote was concerned to learn on that occasion that Stephenson
could not recall having the mask in her home. To remind Stephenson
of the fact, the letter of 2 March refers to a Christmas card send to
Heathcote by Stephenson in 2008 in which Stephenson refers to the
mask being at that time on her wall at home. Heathcote encloses the
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Christmas card with her letter to Stephenson of 2 March 2010. I am
grateful to Laban scholar Dick McCaw, who acted as Stephenson’s
personal representative (her executor, to be precise), for confirming that
the mask was not amongst the belongings for which he had oversight
after her death.

The fact that Heathcote posted her key piece of evidence – the
Christmas card – to Stephenson makes clear that Heathcote’s intentions
regarding her friend were in no way litigious as to the mask. That said,
the statement ‘my Laban mask which I gave into you care to pass on’,
could hardly be clearer in stating that from Heathcote’s point of view
the transfer to Stephenson had been made in trust. Were it not for the
apparent lack of any intention to establish legal, arms-length relations,
the case for a juridical trust would be strong. The trust in question
would not be of the express sort, but of a non-express sort known as a
‘Quistclose trust’ (Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose). Under such a trust, an
asset may be passed to a recipient with a power to deal with it – here, to
pass it on to a ‘Laban association’ – and, in default of compliance with
the condition of onwards transfer, the transferee, Stephenson, would
be bound to hold it on trust for the original transferor, Heathcote.
Heathcote is clearly conscious of, though not actually asserting, her
proprietary claim to the mask and her right to supervise its onwards
passage, or at least to be informed of its whereabouts.

What is most interesting for present purposes is that Heathcote took
upon herself the role of representing the mask. She acts as its advocate,
even to the extent of writing an essay to give her wooden client’s side of
the story in something like the way that the Anglo-Saxon poem Dream
of the Rood recites Christ’s crucifixion from the perspective of the cross.
The Laban mask is a representation of Laban’s idea as represented in
cedar wood by Lola Eytel, and Heathcote in her correspondence and her
essay becomes representative of the representation. Masks thicken like
plots. Now it must be admitted that the significance of the Laban mask
would be similar if, instead of being a mask, it had been some other
culturally significant artefact, but the fact that it is a mask brings in an
extra layer of representation. It is an artefact with a peculiar capacity to
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represent identity, which is precisely why the metaphor of the persona
has been consistently, yet in different ways, so appealing to thinkers
through history, from Cicero to Hobbes to Agamben (Parsley 2010).

One can sense in Heathcote’s correspondence with Stephenson
the weight of the mask as a representation of Laban and his work, the
weight of the historical tradition by which the mask passed between
Laban, Eytel, Heathcote, and Stephenson, and the weight of the legal
representations that we call ‘property’ and ‘rights.’ The legal idea of
property is one of the masks that Noonan most strongly objects to.
He makes the salutary observation that it was this mask that operated
so effectively and so wickedly to efface humanity in the context of the
American slave trade (Noonan 1976: 54-61). We sense in her narrative
that Heathcote was struggling to express her custodial responsibility
without actually wanting to assert her proprietary right. In this
undertaking, the weight of the mask of legal representation seems
to have pressed down upon her like a burden that she was unable to
discharge. That sense of weight is in some sense an embodied experience
of law’s impositions on the human mind and body. As Sean Mulcahy
writes: ‘Law is contingent on the body in order to function’ (2021:
125). Fittingly for our first case study, Mulcahy was writing about
law’s relation to dance. He notes that a dancer when ‘taking on a role
does not carry with them the emotional baggage of a litigant’ but
that ‘they can still find the creation of a legal character emotionally
debilitating’ (Mulcahy 2021: 107-109). The weight of the baggage of
her role as representative of property and of previous holders of the
mask is precisely what we detect in Heathcote’s correspondence with
Stephenson. The burden of our stuff never feels heavier than in the
contemplation of our own mortality, for as we contemplate the passing
of assets on death, we push against the burden of property – and the
properties of the burden – in an effort to discharge it. In the case of
the Laban mask, the mask of legal property has not yet succeeded in
suppressing the dance of humanity. As befits its passage from carver
(Eytel) to dancer (Laban) to carver (Eytel) to teacher (Heathcote) to
dancer (Stephenson), the Laban mask continues to lead us on a merry
dance. Its constant movement refuses to surrender to regulation. The
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mask could have been the subject of a juridical trust, but instead it has
for the time being slipped out of sight and its dance goes on. Laban
would approve.
B The Mask of Pulcinella
Pulcinella is a character or Mask of the commedia dell’arte. Often a
servant or peasant, he has also represented professionals, including legal
advocates (Oreglia 1968 (1961): 93). Oreglia reports (1968 (1961): 94)
that a ‘characteristic of this Mask is to pretend to forget that he is on
the stage.’ It is a characteristic that Goethe witnessed when in his youth
he saw Pulcinella performed in Naples, the city with which Pulcinella
is most closely associated. Goethe told Eckermann that this Pulcinella
had gone home to tell his wife about his day’s success on stage, only
for his wife to remind him that he was still on stage (Goethe 1830). In
this metatheatrical moment, Pulcinella purports to peel of the mask,
but he cannot – because he is a Mask. This is not the lack of free will
that we associate with tragedy, but the world-bound circle of comedy
that is made when actor and audience are joined hand-in-hand in the
dance of humanity. We see the mask and the mask sees us. Everyone
knows. Everyone is free.
The mask worn by Pulcinella is a black, leather half-mask covering
the entire upper face from the hairline of the brow down to and
including the actor’s nose and cheeks. The mask bears a distinctive
wart, the cheeks are pronounced, the nose is large and strong – noble
and not quite comical. Leather theatrical masks of the sort used in the
commedia dell’arte are made using the same techniques as shoemaking.
A wooden last is carved to the desired shape, and the leather is worked
to fit the last. In the Neapolitan and Roman dialect, ‘sola’ indicates both
the sole of a shoe and the leather mask of the comedian.2 The English
pun on sole/soul does not work in Italian. Shakespeare gave the pun
to Gratiano when he rebuked Shylock for sharpening his knife on the
sole of his shoe: ‘not on thy sole, but on thy soul’ (Merchant of Venice
4.1.122)), but Italian sola and English ‘soul’ work together to suggest
a pun with a profound point to it, which is that the comedian’s mask

38

Passing resemblance:
the burden of the mask in legal and theatrical tradition

might be the very soul of their dramatic role and certainly not ‘only
a trick’, to recall Grotowski’s phrase. This sense of the deep mask is
potent in ancient forms of ritual theatre. It is thought, for example,
that the masked rites of the Greek Dionysian mysteries morphed
into the masked choral theatre of ancient Greece, and that these in
turn eventually inspired the masks of the Roman pantomime, and in
due course the Italian commedia dell’arte. The masked theatre even
slipped sideways into Neapolitan puppetry, which is a sort of ‘total
mask’ performance, in which the chief protagonist carries the name
of Pulcinella. When the Italians brought the marionette Pulcinella
to England he became Punchinello of ‘Punch and Judy’ fame. The
essence of comedy is that it goes in circles, and the lawless Mr Punch
who evades police, judge, and jail, has in one sense come full circle in
his mockery of English law, for Cicero himself once warned his legal
protégé Gaius Trebatius Testa that if he spent too long in Britain, he
might find himself represented in the pantomime: ‘A British jurist
would make a marvellous figure of fun!’3
The most famous modern bearer of the mask of Pulcinella is the
eminent Italian actor, playwright, and screenwriter, Eduardo De
Filippo. For much of what follows, I am indebted to Teresa Megale’s
chapter ‘Eduardo De Filippo and the Mask of Pulcinella’ (2018: 27785). Megale writes eloquently of the relationship between the actor’s
bodily mask and the superfice of the commedia mask:
the wrinkles on Eduardo’s face – reflecting a richly expressive theatrical
technique and a total mastery of mimetic and vocal skills – seem to
become synchronised both physiognomically and artistically with the
mask. With a few, carefully measured facial expressions, De Filippo
transcends the boundaries of the possible and miraculously transmits
the visible traces of an art of theatre which has not been lost, but has
been kept alive and will be kept alive by future generations of actors
(Megale 2018: 278).

Without the leather mask on, De Filippo’s face is extraordinarily
expressive, but what may be more extraordinary is that his expressiveness
is not diminished by wearing the mask. Indeed, the mask uncannily
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enlarges the actor’s expressiveness by opening up a space in which, by
imaginative inference, the viewer can represent their own emotions
through the medium of the mask.

The reader can witness the phenomenon in De Filippo’s performance
of Pulcinella thanks to the television documentary Pulcinella Ieri e
Oggi (‘Pulcinella: Yesterday and Today’) (Heusch 1973). De Filippo was
seventy-three years old when the documentary was made. It began as
a project to acquaint English actors – including such household names
as Laurence Olivier, Joan Plowright, Frank Finlay, and Martin Shaw –
with De Filippo’s work as they prepared to perform Saturday, Sunday,
Monday, an English language adaption of Eduardo de Filippo’s Sabato,
Domenica e Lunedi (1959), under the direction of Franco Zeffirelli at
London’s The Old Vic theatre from 23 October 1973. (Incidentally,
the English language adaptation by Keith Waterhouse and Willis
Hall won the Best British Play of the Year Award in 1973.) As we
watch the documentary, presented by Zeffirelli, it is clear that it serves
a more lasting purpose as De Filippo’s way of passing on the mask
into the collective consciousness of the viewing public. In it, he dons
Pulcinella’s black leather half-mask and his distinctive coppolone – the
white ‘sugarloaf ’ (pan di zucchero) soft hat. The masked De Filippo
then proceeds in the character of Pulcinella to rattle through a series
of antithetically-paired emotional states – tearful and happy, cold and
hot, love and hatred, swaggering and bashful, doubt and decisiveness,
yes and no – each of which he introduces with a one-word description –
‘dubio’ and so forth. The last word ‘paura’ (‘fear’) is performed without
any antithetical partner. Throughout the three-minute demonstration,
De Filippo inhabits and mediates Pulcinella, and also speaks as
Pulcinella’s advocate.
De Filippo passes on the mask to us all, but he also passed on the
mask in a more intimate way to his actor son, Luca. At the age of
twenty, Luca’s first role as an adult actor was as the title character in
his father’s play, Il Figlio di Pulcinella: Racconto Moderno di una Favola
Antica (‘Pulcinella’s Son: The Modern Tale of an Ancient Fable’). The play,
written between 1955 and 1959, tells the ‘sad story of the end of the
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mask tradition’ and ‘it is not inconceivable that the elder De Filippo
consciously chose this work as a means of passing on his artistic
legacy to his son, following the tradition of the comici transmitting
their art from fathers to sons’ (Megale 2018: 282-3). For the tradition
of passing the comedian’s mask from father to son, Megale cites the
example of Salvatore Petito passing the mask of Pulcinella to his son
Antonio over a century before Luca De Filippo received it. Fittingly,
the leather mask of Pulcinella that featured in Il Figlio di Pulcinella was
itself an iteration of the traditional of passing on a craft from father
to son. The artisan who made it was Donato Sartori, who learned
his craft in the mask-making workshop of his father Amleto Sartori
(http://www.sartorimaskmuseum.it/). The tradition of passing on the
mask of Pulcinella from actor to actor was not always a family affair.
Megale explains that the mask of Pulcinella has ‘changed hands
innumerable times since the era of the legendary, seventeenth-century
actors.’ Referring to the inauguration of the Teatro San Ferdinando,
when Eduardo De Filippo ‘received the mask of Pulcinella out of the
hands of Salvatore de Muto (1876-1970), the last representative of the
company of players of the Teatro San Carlo’, she notes that:
De Muto had worn it since 1913, after inheriting it from Giuseppe
De Martino, his immediate artistic predecessor. Almost eighty years
old, de Muto-Pulcinella placed the black leather half-mask on the lean,
gaunt and wrinkled face of the mature De Filippo with a solemnity
reminiscent of an ancient ceremony of investiture … It was a true rite of
passage: De Filippo was the performer chosen as the only one worthy
of wearing the mask after the voluntary ‘ death ’ on stage of the previous
holder. Thus the ‘new’ Pulcinella was born (Megale 2018: 280).

Comedy is in essence cyclical. In comedy, death is never final and
tragic; it is just a stage we pass over in the never-ending circle of death
and rebirth. When the mask is passed from comedian to comedian,
the symbolic and actual death of the holder is healed by keeping the
mask alive. When it passes on death it also passes on life.
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C The Hannya Mask
The hannya mask is the mask of a female demon in the tradition of
Japanese Noh theatre Nohgaku (能楽). Noh is by certain measures
the oldest continuously extant mainstream theatre form in the world,
having been performed since the 14th century (the-noh.com). Before
the 20th century, all Noh actors were male, even those performing
female parts. Kabuki theatre, which originated a couple of centuries
after Noh and is an altogether more energetic affair in which actors
wear make-up instead of masks, was originally an all-female practice
performed by courtesans but soon became, and remains to this day,
an exclusively male art. In Noh plays, only the lead actor and key
supporting actors wear a mask. Actors who don’t wear masks are
meant to make a neutral and stable mask of their own physical face.
The worn masks (noh-men), of which there are hundreds of variations
based on a handful of essential types – god, warrior, woman, fanatical
woman, demon – are carved from Japanese cypress and finely painted
with traditional pigments. On the Noh stage, the actor animates the
mask and costume of their character through slow, gestural movements
and incanted, spoken word, accompanied by the musicians and chorus
present at the rear of the stage.
Edwin Lee’s short film The Spirit of Noh (2018) features Michishige
Udaka (1947-2020), a master performer of Noh theatre who was a
member of a family that were Noh actors three hundred years ago. Up
until his death in 2020, Master Udaka was the last surviving Noh actor
who was also a master craftsman in the art of making Noh masks. In
the film, he says that:
To protect traditional arts, we need to create a movement and spread
it in one big wave. If not, Japan will just become a “robotic country”
driven solely by pure economics. The fact that Noh has lasted for so
long means there must be a purpose to it. That is why I feel responsible
to pass it on (7’45).

Immediately before a section on the hannya mask (2’55), he explains
that ‘When the audience sees the actor without a mask, and if they see
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the expression on their face, the feelings may seem too superficial – you
can’t enter any deeper – but if it’s a mask you can use your imagination
to dive deeper’ (2’40). This reiterates the point made in the previous
section about De Filippo wearing the mask of Pulcinella. Whatever
might be lost when the mask covers the actor’s natural facial expression
is more than compensated by the imaginative potential that the mask
opens up for the spectator.

The hannya mask is one of the most elaborate in the Noh repertoire,
and it has been conjectured that the word hannya (‘wisdom’) might refer
to the special skill that is required to make it. It is particularly associated
with jealous women who transform into demonic spirits, and takes the
form of a ghostly white face that is at once sorrowful, tortured, and
enraged. A written description is no substitute for seeing the thing,
which is easily done with an internet search in the absence of access to
the physical artefact, but by way of a brief sketch we can note that the
most distinctive feature of the hannya mask is a pair of long and sharp
horns protruding upwards just above the hairline of the forehead – the
hairline is indicated by fine lines of painted black hair. The eyebrows
are furrowed up together in the middle of the brow, forming with the
cheeks an almost rectangular frame within which bulbous gold-painted
eyes are set in a wild stare. Below a broad nose, the wide angular grin or
grimace of the mouth frames a fearsome array of large, gold-tinted teeth
that includes canines exaggerated into fangs. The use of gold pigment
indicates that this is a non-human entity. As with all Noh masks,
slight tilting of the mask upwards or downwards during performance
changes the form as the spectator sees it and serves to indicate shifts in
the emotional state expressed. The YouTube channel Mellow In Japan
hosts an informative video on Noh theatre that discusses the hannya
mask (Mellow In Japan 2018: 22’02), and the play Dōjōji in which the
mask features. The plot of that play, which in some form goes back a
thousand years, tells the tale of a woman who becomes enamoured of
a priest and takes demonic form to punish him when he tries to flee
from her. The play is instantly recognisable in performance because of
the huge prop bell located stage centre (Mellow In Japan 2018: 1’49).
(An antecedent of Dōjōji is a play called Kanemaki, which means
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‘enwrapped in a bell’.) The setting for the main action of Dōjōji is the
eight-century Dōjō-ji Buddhist temple in Wakayama prefecture. One
of the treasures of that temple is a striking painting by Kōgyo Tsukioka
(1869–1927) of an actor performing Dōjōji (Tsukioka nd). He wears
the hannya mask and the distinctive skirted kimono decorated with
appliqué roundels (maru zukashi) that always accompanies the hannya
mask. In the painting, the thread securing the mask to the actor’s face
is visible piercing the ears of the mask.

Where a mask is clearly capable of being removed it invites the
audience to inquire into the relation between human nature and art,
and to imagine themselves as a bearer of the emotions presented.
What would we imagine if the mask could not be removed? This is the
invitation made in the cult Japanese horror film Onibaba (Shindo 1964),
in which a hannya mask becomes fixed to the face of its bearer. The film
is set during a fourteenth century civil war. Two women, a mother and
her daughter-in-law, are in the business of murdering soldiers, stealing
their belongings, and selling them to eke out a meagre living in the
inhospitable terrain of a reed marsh. The mother is jealous when the
daughter-in-law embarks on an affair with a young man living nearby,
and when she offers herself to the young man she is rebuffed. Here is
the trope of the scorned woman that is the traditional summons for the
appearance of the hannya mask. One night, when the daughter-in-law
is visiting her lover, the mother is approached by a Samurai wearing a
hannya mask who has become lost in the reeds. She murders him and
after an arduous struggle manages to prise the mask from his face,
revealing his disfigured features beneath. She subsequently pretends to
be an evil spirit by donning the mask and the samurai’s robe in order to
deter the daughter-in-law from visiting her lover. The climactic terror of
the film is the moment when the daughter-in-law comes home from a
night-time excursion to find her mother cowering in the corner of their
hut, unable to remove the mask that has become fixed to her face. The
young woman is persuaded to try to prise the mask off and eventually
has to resort to a large wooden mallet to break it off. Every blow beats
agonisingly on the older woman as if the mask were her living flesh.
When the mask eventually breaks off, the woman’s features, like those
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of the samurai, are disfigured.

Beware the mask that needs no strings! When the strings can
be untied, we are assured that the human is not forcibly bound to its
persona and that what we are witnessing is a performance of human
will. Expression of will is comedy and life; suppression of will is tragedy
and death (Watt 2016: 84). There is a particular risk in the context of the
commercial corporation that the mask of the artificial legal person will
capture and occlude the humans who are invested in it. The corporate
mask has become marionette, endowed with a life that survives any
mere removal of the corporate veil and which achieves a life independent
of the humans that depend upon it. Even if we can see the humans
under, behind, and above it, the strings that bind the corporation
to the humans cannot be relied upon to move in response to human
motivations. The mask moves with a will of its own – unresponsive –
and, crucially, lacking ethical responsibility to the humans who bear
it and bear with it. The culmination of the law’s Pinocchio project by
which legal persona has morphed into a commercial marionette was
made express by the Supreme Court of The United Kingdom in 2013,
when the court explained that:
It is inaccurate to describe the process of lifting the corporate veil
as ignoring the separate status of the company. That status remains
untouched. Thus, remedies typically are granted against the puppeteer
and the puppet company. What is lifted is the protection from liability
afforded to those operating behind the veil so that a puppeteer is no
longer entitled to the protection afforded in respect of conduct carried
out through the use of the corporate entity (VTB Capital plc v Nutritek
International Corpn: 346).

The controller can be controlled, but the ‘untouched’ puppet of
the corporate person becomes untouchable; a hand puppet that needs
no hand, a marionette that needs no strings. The law has made the
artificial person of the corporation for the primary purpose of ensuring
that economic enterprise can outlive the short span of a human life.
The law’s nepotism towards its created and deathless child – the legal
commercial corporation – might explain why during the Covid-19

45

Gary Watt

pandemic it was at times possible for two customers to sit next to each
other mask-less on a commercial flight eating corporately branded
snacks while on the ground mourners could not attend funerals or
could only do so wearing masks and while observing social distancing.
Funerals are not a priority for undying institutions.
3 Conclusion
This essay has been about the vesting of visors and about human
investment in visors. We have seen the human visage dissolving into
the visor, and vice-versa. The metaphor of the legal person as theatrical
mask is a dead metaphor. To the extent that it still has life, it is tired,
trite, worn out. I have therefore endeavoured to invigorate the metaphor
with reference to three powerful theatrical personas and the powerful
personalities who have carried them off and passed them on. Through
this effort, we have found that theatrical masking has implications
for the represented and for representatives. The word ‘implications’
is deliberate, for it implies a folding in, a layering, and a thickening.
The act of representation folds De Filippo into Pulcinella; it lays on
Heathcote the great weight of property that is in a thin beechwood
mask; and when Master Udaka wears the Noh mask, it represents him
and his traditions as much as he represents it. All of this is as it should
be. There is comedy in the circularity of it all. Comedy, though, is always
within touching distance of tragedy, and the tragedy descends when
masks become too thick and too hard for us to bear. In law, the danger
is always present in the dynamic by which representations represent
representations in ever-thickening layers – the laying down of the law
like a carapace around the human actor to the point at which the mask
no longer responds to human motivations and refuses to pass on as it
should. Law itself is just another mask – a catch-all category that covers
a loose group of very different people and a range of widely divergent
human interests. I said at the outset of this article that I hoped to
indicate another route towards the same ‘theatrical jurisprudence’ that
Marett Leiboff espouses in her eponymous book. The examples of the
three masks that have been my case studies are way markers on that
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route, for the challenge of theatrical jurisprudence is to notice where
and how law performs and is performed, and to appreciate where and
how its performance antagonises human performance and antagonises
itself. As in every field of law and humanities, the project of theatrical
jurisprudence is one that seeks to turn the regular beat of the law into
something like a heartbeat that might reanimate the corpus and corpse
of law.

Visors are investitures of the living and vestiges of the dead. Even
the journal Masks: The Online Journal of Law and Theatre seems to
have passed into memory, or passed out of memory; the second, and
presumably last, issue was published in 2012, and I can find no sign
of it having life since then. I don’t know if it was passed on, or if it has
simply passed on. The same is, for the time being, true of the Laban
mask. The visor is elusive and evasive. It might seem frustrating that
so many masks cannot be found, but although the very name of ‘visor’
promises a seen thing, much of the visor’s power resides in its power
to evade our scrutiny. Jacques Derrida once made allusion to the law as
‘masked power’ (Derrida 1992: 13), but a significant aspect of the power
of the law is its success in making its mask invisible or insignificant by
inviting us to pass through it in pursuit of the law’s promise of inner
depth. The error of accepting that invitation is the error of passing
over the mask instead of pausing to consider the mask’s own inherent
power. Of course, even when we see the visor, we can never see all its
significations at once. It belongs to the past and to the future as much
as to the present. It is a repetition, a dress rehearsal, a re-presentation,
and a representation of something other. What we are invited to
imagine when we see the fixed form of a Noh mask, or the mask of
Pulcinella, or the narrative vestiges of the Laban mask, is the human
investment in the vestige. We are asked to feel the human life within,
and to appreciate that the life lies as much in what we as witnesses
bring to the thing as in what the thing brings to us.
We cannot strip away the mask without eviscerating humanity’s
great cultural and social investment in the protections and performative
possibilities that the mask affords. As Hannah Arendt warned in her

47

Gary Watt

critique of the French Revolution, ‘the Reign of Terror eventually
spelled the exact opposite of true liberation and true equality; it
equalized because it left all inhabitants equally without the protecting
mask of a legal personality’ (Arendt 1963: 104). The use of the word
‘inhabitants’ is apposite here. The masks of legal and social personality
are aspects of human habit. We find security in them, even as they
impose their security on us. Habitus is something that literally ‘has
us’ in the sense that it holds us, with all the positive and negative
connotations that having and holding bring with them. As I’ve argued
elsewhere (Watt 2013: 4), the custom or costume of our legal person
is something to which we become socially accustomed in the sense –
specifically Bourdieu’s sociological sense – that it becomes our habitus
(Bourdieu 1977). The mask exemplifies this phenomenon of habitus,
for we willingly inhabit it even as it literally holds on to us. This is just
as we should expect, for as Michael de Certau has written: ‘There is no
law that is not inscribed on bodies. Every law has a hold on the body’
(2002: 139). Beyond this, is the more fearful possibility that the law’s
ultimate project is to perform itself and acquire and inhabit a body
of its own – one that will not need us. In the face of that possibility,
confrontation is called for. The human person as it passes on in cultures
across generations must resist the stifling self-sufficiency of legal
personhood, not least where that personhood presents itself in the
cold front of an undying corporate entity. Resistance requires action,
and this is where the practice of theatrical jurisprudence comes into
its own. The masks of law are supervisors watching over us to protect,
to suppress, and to protect through suppression. In the face of this,
the survival of humanity requires that we should all put on our masks.
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